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On 14 February 2017, the European Commission submitted a  proposal to reform the EU comitology system. It
aims at enhancing transparency and accountability when implementing EU law in certain highly contentious
policy areas, in which science-based decision-making by the Commission is not able to fully address national
and regional concerns. The Commission is right in refusing to take the sole blame for unpopular EU decisions
which Member States helped adopting, especially in a Union riddled by crisis and rising populism. Despite some
difficulties of design, the proposal should be supported because it aims to preserve the main function of
comitology: to exercise control over the implementing powers of the Commission by de-centralising decision-
making, and to introduce local knowledge, political, socio-economic, ethical, and sustainability considerations
into an otherwise technocratic process.
Why reforming comitology?
Comitology is the EU term for a system of committees composed of representatives from Member States that
oversee the Commission’s implementation of EU legislation, and which must be consulted every time the
Commission wants to adopt a so-called implementing act. While seemingly the realm of technocracy, many EU
implementing acts transcend the boundary between technical and political decisions as they may have a serious
impact on people’s health, the environment or other public interests.
The recent reform proposal reacts to protracted problems of deadlock and politicization in certain sensitive policy
areas, such as the EU authorization of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and chemicals, particularly plant
protection products. In principle, comitology fosters deliberative and consensual decision-making practices. Over
90 % of opinions of comitology committees are adopted by unanimity or consensus. The comitology regulation
stipulates that decision-making shall endeavor to find solutions which command the widest possible support
within the committee.
Comitology is therefore seen as an example par excellence of a networked deliberative forum that allows for
constructive cooperation and a non-hierarchical mode of decision-making between the EU and its Member
States. It represents the truly European value of unity in diversity, and as such provides for a unique source of
legitimacy for supranational executive decision-making.
But it does not always work that way. In some few but highly politicized areas comitology persistently reverts to
deadlock and lack of agreement between the Commission and Member States as well as among the Member
States. GMO authorization is the main example where cooperation fails. Since the entry into force of the current
GMO legal framework Member States have never managed to find agreement in the relevant comitology
committee (the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health), thereby effectively precluding
national input into the authorization process.
This has to do with comitology voting rules. To either approve or oppose the Commission authorization of a
GMO, the standing committee has to reach a qualified majority (55 % of Member States representing 65 % of the
EU population). Failure to find such majority is counted as “no opinion,” which means that the Commission may
not authorize unless it repeats the procedure before an Appeals Committee. A “no opinion” in the Appeals
Committee means that the Commission may adopt the authorization. There is thus a certain amount of
discretion, and the Commission is not obliged to authorize. Yet in reality the Commission has so far always
authorized the GMO in question. It has done so following the positive safety assessment of its expert agency, the
European Food Safety Authority, yet in the face of strong political opposition among the Member States. While
failing to produce a qualified majority, a simple majority of Member States has always voted against
authorization.
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A dramatic example of this is the vote on  Maize 1507 in February 2014 where only five Member States voted in
favour, four abstained, and 19 voted against the authorization. Another example is the authorization of
glyphosate, a controversial substance used in plant protection products, in June last year. Seven Member States
abstaining prevented an opinion in the Appeals Committee leading to a Commission authorization without the
support of the Member States. This shows that abstentions of some big Member States (especially Germany,
Italy and France) have been crucial in preventing a qualified majority, and thus an effective committee opinion.
As I have argued elsewhere, the reversion to top-down decision-making by the Commission in this highly
controversial area has resulted in the loss of political responsibility for EU implementing acts, thereby
undermining their legitimacy. The recent reform proposal seems to tackle precisely this problem, and it shows
that the Commission no longer accepts being a scapegoat for unpopular EU decisions.
The new proposal
The gist of the new proposal is to enhance the transparency and accountability of the comitology system through
mainly four measures. Firstly, abstentions shall no longer be counted as votes in the appeals committee.
Secondly, a third stage involving national ministers shall be included in cases where the Appeals Committee is
not able to produce a decision. In such cases, thirdly, there shall also be the possibility to consult the Council of
Ministers. And finally, voting behaviour in the Appeals Committee shall be made public.
This proposal should be seen in the light of the current EU constitutional framework introduced by the Lisbon
treaty in 2009 as well as of the last comitology reform in 2011, which reacted to that framework. In particular, the
Lisbon Treaty reasserted the primary competence of Member States to implement acts of Union law, thus
reinforcing the principle of executive federalism in the EU legal system. While in certain cases the Commission
may exercise implementing powers, the exercise of those powers shall be controlled by the Member States
through comitology (Article 291 TFEU). In contrast to the pre-Lisbon comitology system, the currently applicable
Comitology Regulation, abolished the so-called Council stage and replaced it with the Appeals Committee
composed of representatives of the Member States. It was also assumed that this change would help de-
politicizing decision-making in areas such as GMOs, because the appeal stage would no longer be dominated
by the political leaders of national ministries.
This was wishful thinking. The political dynamics of the last stage of comitology have remained the same, with
COREPER members from the Permanent Representations dominating the process (and hence the same people
who are preparing ministerial Council meetings). Against this background, it is not entirely clear what the
Commission would like to achieve with the latest proposal to de-facto reintroduce the Council stage. Not only are
there tensions with the Lisbon framework and Article 291, although the Commission tries to address them by
tweaking the details (national ministers shall be involved rather than the Council; the latter shall be merely
consulted). The added value is also not clear, as the Appeals Committee at present is not composed of national
experts but of diplomats already acting on direction of their ministers.
The other two proposals of excluding abstentions and rendering national votes transparent, however, are more
promising. The practice of blaming the EU for GMO authorizations, even though Member States helped adopting
them, is problematic especially in a Union riddled by crisis and rising populism. Several Member States, among
them Germany, have chosen the path of conflict avoidance: by abstaining they are avoiding a clash with
domestic interests divided between public opposition to GMOs and domestic industry pressures. But in doing so,
they are also avoiding an open and honest public discussion about the societal advantages and disadvantages
of agricultural biotechnology. Moreover, they are undermining the purpose of comitology, namely to control the
exercise of Commission implementing powers while introducing broader aspects, such as local knowledge,
political, socio-economic, ethical, and sustainability considerations, into an otherwise technocratic decision-
making process. Having said that, it is clear that the Commission reform proposal is likely to face strong
opposition by several Member States, including Germany, in the Council. The European Parliament, on the other
hand, may turn out to be an ally of the Commission, given that it has been a vocal critic of comitology for its lack
of political and democratic oversight.
The limits of Commission’s political authority
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But what about the Commission’s discretion to revise a contentious proposal (e.g. to authorize a GMO), and to
reject authorization in situations where, although not reaching a qualified majority, a significant number of
Member States votes against such a proposal? After all, an important change introduced by the current
Comitology Regulation was to abolish the Commission’s obligation to adopt a proposal in situations of “no
opinion.” Moreover, under the current GMO legislation the Commission has the right to take into consideration
“other legitimate factors” in addition to the risk assessment of its expert agency when authorizing GMOs. In
practice, however, the Commission sees its discretion to deviate from EFSA opinions as virtually non-existent. It
relies, among other things, on internal market law arguments as well as the right to good administration, which
in the Commission’s view preclude an EU-wide ban of GMOs considered safe by EFSA. These arguments are
legally contentious (and are discussed, e.g., here, here and here) and arguably in tension with CJEU case law
on the non-binding nature of scientific advice in EU risk regulation (see e.g. Pfizer and CEVA). A more plausible
explanation is the technocratic self-understanding of the Commission, deeply entrenched in the Community
method, which places the Commission as an unelected and independent institution at the heart of the EU policy-
making process. Instead of an electoral mandate, the Commission therefore relies on science and expertise as
an existential political resource to justify regulatory action. The more contentious a policy field, the more the
Commission’s reliance on seemingly apolitical scientific expertise.
EU regulation of GMOs is a fascinating case testing the limits of EU regulatory authority in the internal market,
including the deliberative qualities of the comitology system. The 2015 reform, which partially re-nationalized
decision-making on GMO cultivation, was therefore a step in the right direction. Cases like this call for the ‘no-
final-decider principle’ according to which the EU might well not be the appropriate locus of authority to take
collective decisions at present, although dialogue must nonetheless go on. If successful, the now proposed
comitology reform would follow the same logic. It could potentially help preventing the adoption of decisions at
EU level, which do not enjoy political or even legal authority given their persistent non-implementation at the
national level; or, at least it would help rendering the political responsibility for such decisions more visible.
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